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these communities never had the true 
grounds for an independent existence, 
and after all, that was why they were in 
the federation. 
In other words, the exclusive claims 
of "superior" nationalisms steal the 
historicitv of communities who are 
imprisoned in the nomenclature of eth- 
nic minorities. In this context, the ulti- 
mate truth to the tragedy of the 
Yugoslavian civil war is that it has a 
generic nature which echoes the main 
premises of the "one nation to one 
nation-state" model of the European 
tradition, and as such, it is prone toper- 
petual reproduction. 
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Michael Barutciski 
The concept of "preventive protec- 
tion" (or preventive diplomacy) has 
been used by UNHCR in recent years 
to help justify its shift of focus from 
external asylum to internal assistance. 
In the case of the former Yugoslav Re- 
public of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is in- 
appropriate for the powerful states 
that control UNHCR1 to speak of pre- 
ventive protection when their foreign 
policy had more to do with geopoliti- 
cal objectives than with finding a solu- 
tion that could have realistically 
helped avert the war. This article 
presents selected legal problems that 
help in understanding the armed con- 
flict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Three Nations 
There were three constituent nations 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Croats, Serbs 
and Muslims. According to the 1981 
census figures, the population of the 
Republic was composed as follows: 20 
percent Croat, 37 percent Serb, 40 per- 
cent Muslim. The remainder of the 
population included various minori- 
ties and people who identified them- 
selves as "Yugo~lavs."~The t rm from 
which the translation "nation" is ob- 
tained, narod, is used in the 1974 Con- 
stitution in a way that most resembles 
the German Volk in that it refers to a 
people defined culturally rather than 
to citizenry. 
There has been a certain confusion 
in the way many western media 
sources have used the terms "Mus- 
lim" /"Bosnian." Muslims were recog- 
nized de facto as a distinct nation in the 
1971 census and de jure in the 1974 
Cdnsit~tion.~ With their own growing 
nationalist sentiment, Muslims re- 
sented being referred to as "Serbs" or 
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"Croats" who had simply converted to 
Islam under the Ottoman rule in order 
to enjoy privileges. Likewise, the term 
"Yugoslav" did not accommodate 
their desire to have their own distinct 
culture recognized. Therefore, the 
term "Muslim" (with a capital "M") 
was officially adopted. 
Focusing on the legal terms regard- 
ing the various nations in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina helps avoid confusion 
and manipulation. Since the term 
"Bosnian" does not distinguish which 
of the three nations is being referred to, 
its use can easily lead to confusion. For 
example, using the term to designate 
the Muslims (as is often done in the 
western media) leads to the erroneous 
identification of the state (reduced by 
the media to "Bosnia") with the Mus- 
lim population. This ignores the fact 
that the majority of the inhabitants of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina belong to the 
Croat and Serb nations and have been 
present on the territory for as long as 
the Muslims themselves. Using the 
term "Bosnian" as a multi-ethnic cat- 
egory which includes all three nations 
is also misleading since it does not ac- 
curately reflect the political forces at 
play: 
Let's not kid ourselves either about 
the nature of the [Muslim-control- 
led] Bosnian government ... It is only 
to the outside world that the Bosnian 
government maintains the fiction of 
its "multi-ethnic" character, for the 
obvious reason that a multi-ethnic 
state is more likely to get interna- 
tional aid.4 
These comments lead us to other legal 
issues regarding the representation of 
the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herze- 
govina. 
Constitutional Crisis 
Even though it is the source of the 
present armed conflict, there has been 
almost no discussion of the constitu- 
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tional crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The first free elections of that state's 
short history (Tito's Communists cre- 
ated the Republic by joining two geo- 
graphic regions at the end of World 
War 11) were held in 1990 and resulted 
in the nationalist parties of the three 
constittrent nations taking 86 percent 
of theivote in proportions generally 
reflecting their percentages of the 
populati~n.~ 
The three nationalist parties agreed 
to share various fun+ns at the Re- 
publican leveL6 This was in accordance 
with the 1974 Constitution which pro- 
vided for the equality of the three con- 
stituent nations. At the local level, 
however, absolute control was seized 
by the party that represented the ma- 
jority group in each particular region.' 
The tensions in the parliament of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina finally exploded 
when the Muslim and Croat parties 
agreed to proclaim the sovereignty of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in October, 1991. 
The Serbs withdrew and created their 
own parliament near Sarajevo (Pale).B 
In the meantime, the parliament of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina found itself at an 
impasse since it had to enact a new 
constitution in order for the state to 
become independent. To do this le- 
gally, it needed the participation of the 
Serb parliamentarians. 
Recognition of Independence . 
Despite the fact that the parliament of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina no longer con- 
tained the elected representatives of 
one of the constituent nations and that 
the state was as constitutionally ille- 
gitimate as the state of Yugoslavia fol- 
lowing the withdrawal of Slovenia and 
Croatia, the Muslim-controlled Presi- 
dency decided to seek international 
recognition for the independence of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European 
Community's Arbitration Commis- 
sion (composed of the presidents of 
five European Union (EU) member 
constitutional courts and assigned to 
deal with legal problems regarding the 
former Yugoslavia) was thus notified 
on December 20,1991, so that it could 
examine the request. The very sugges- 
tion that the EU made it possible for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to ask that its in- 
dependence be recognized under 
those circumstances left those who 
'were aware of the situation very 
~ o r r i e d . ~  
Nonetheless, the request was exam- 
ined and an advisory opinion was 
given on January 11, 1992.1° The Arbi- 
tration Commission rejected the re- 
quest while noting "that the Serbian 
members of the Presidency did not as- 
sociate themselves" with the various 
independence declarations and under- 
takings. Referring to the wishes of the 
Serbs to remain in a Yugoslav federa- 
tion as established by a plebiscite and a 
Serb Assembly resolution, the Arbitra- 
tion Commission declared "that the 
. . . When the predictable 
refugee flows began crossing 
borders, these same states 
[with self-interest] avoided 
providing refuge for victims 
of the war . . . 
will of the peoples of Bosnia-Herze- 
govina to constitute the SRBH [Social- 
ist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina] as 
a sovereign and independent State 
cannot be held to have been fully es- 
tablished." It concluded that its posi- 
tion could be reviewed if "appropriate 
guarantees were provided by the Re- 
public applying for recognition, possi- 
bly by means of a referendum of all the 
citizens of the SRBH without distinc- 
tion, carried out under international 
supervision" (emphasis added). 
The Muslim and Croat parliamen- 
tarians thus decided to hold a referen- 
dum on independence even though 
the Serbs vowed to boycott it. The re- 
sults were made public on March 1, 
1992: the Muslims and Croats who 
participated voted overwhelmingly 
for independence, while the Serbs ef- 
fectively boycotted the referendum. 
Yet the EU's policy on Bosnia- 
Herzegovina was more nuanced. 
Along with the possibility of recogni- 
tion, the EU organized negotiations 
between the three sides so that the Re- 
public could become a confederation 
divided into three thnic regions. It 7 
had been clear for many months that 
no agreement between the three na- 
tionalist parties could be achieved le- 
gally and legitimately that did not 
involve a substantial transfer of power 
from the centralized Republican gov- 
ernment to the representatives of the 
three constituent nations. 
Moreover, none of the parties would 
accept any form of domination by an- 
other party. The Muslims and the 
Croats feared the Serb nationalist party 
which was under the influence of Ser- 
bia's aggressive President Milosevic; 
the Muslims and the Serbs also feajed 
the Croat nationalist party which in- 
cluded hard-liners associated with the 
nationalist party of Croatia's President 
Tudjman; the Serbs and the Croats 
equally feared the Muslim nationalist 
party which included some radical Is- 
lamic tendencies." So it is not surpris- 
ing that negotiations +re held 
between the three constituent nations 
in order to divide the territory of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in a manner that 
would be acceptable to the nationalist 
leaders. Indeed,. such an agreement 
was finally reached on February 23, 
1992, in Lisbon. 
International Intervention 
Yet it would be a grave mistake to be- 
lieve that the actors at this stage were 
only former Yugoslavs. The emerging 
conflict had captured the attention of 
variousinterests around the world and 
this resulted in certain powerful states 
reacting accordingly.12 Of particular 
importance is the United States inter- 
vention: the US Ambassador to Yugo- 
slavia at the time has since admitted in 
an interview that he convinced Presi- 
dent Izetbegovic to publicly renounce 
the Lisbon agreement soon after hav- 
ing signed it.13 This was done because 
the US government had decided at that 
point to recognize the Republic and to 
support Izetbegovic's government in 
the UN if it "got into trouble." Conse- 
quently, the US government con- 
vinced the EU states to recognize the 
Republic on April 6,1992 by agreeing 
to recognize Croatia and Slovenia 
along with Bosnia-Herzegovina the 
following day.14 
I 
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Thus the international community 
proceeded to recognize the independ- 
ence of a state that had ceased to exist 
in any meaningful way: the constitu- 
tional crisis had left a parliament that 2. 
no longer represented the three con- 
stituent nations, the Muslim-control- 
led Presidency's authority was denied 
by a majority of its putative citizens 
and the territory was being seized by 
violent militia units from the various 3. 
constituent nations. As the govern- 
ment was being taken over by the 
Muslims, it was given a seat in the 
UN's General Assembly despite the 
fact that it was engaged in an armed 
conflict with the other two constituent 
nations. In the context of the brutal 
disintegration of the former Yugosla- 
via, this situation only helped to assure 4. 
that the parties to the conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina would seek their goals15 
by the most ruthless military means. 
Far from preventing an explosive 
situation, self-interested members of 5. 
the international community contrib- 
uted in aggravating a situation that 
any informed observer should have 
known would lead to massive dis- 
placement of civilian populations: 6. 
By denying that partition of Bosnia 
could take place when in fact it was 
inevitable, the international commu- 
nity ensured that it would be accom- 
plished in the worst possible way. 
The map of Bosnia was redrawn in 
blood on the ground, rather than 
around a table.16 
Furthermore, when the predictable 
refugee flows began crossing borders, 7. 
these same states avoided providing 
refuge for victims of the war while in- 
sisting that their contribution to refu- 8. 
gee protection would focus on 
concepts such as "preventive protec- 
tion." The ease of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is an example of these concepts being 
used essentially to help powerful 
states justify to their own populations 
the containment of refugee fl0ws.m 
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